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In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors argue that if New York’s
proposed Billionaire Mark-to-Market Tax Act is
enacted, it should be upheld against any
constitutional challenge based on retroactivity.

It is well known in tax literature that
rudimentary tax planning strategies enable
wealthy individuals to avoid state and federal
income tax on much of their true economic
1
income. Indeed, the existing income tax has been
described as being effectively optional for those
who derive their income chiefly from the
ownership of assets rather than the provision of
2
services. The reason is — except for a few
relatively narrowly tailored deemed-realization
rules3 — both state and federal income taxes rely
on the realization principle. Under realization
accounting, taxpayers generally do not owe tax on
economic gains until they sell their appreciated
assets. Moreover, this is so even when taxpayers
fund lavish lifestyles by borrowing against their
appreciated assets.
Legislation under consideration in New York
would limit the ability of the state’s wealthiest
taxpayers to escape tax in this manner. The
Billionaire Mark-to-Market (MTM) Tax Act
(S. 8277B/A. 10414) would require these taxpayers
to reports gains and losses as they accrue, rather
than upon sale or exchange as under current law.
Opponents claim that the MTM Act is
unconstitutional. In a separate essay, we will
explain why and how the New York Constitution
authorizes accrual taxation through deemed
realizations as in the MTM Act (and also as in a
number of existing provisions of state income tax

1

See, e.g., David Gamage and John R. Brooks, “Tax Now or Tax Never:
Political Optionality and the Case for Current-Assessment Tax Reform”
(unpublished draft manuscript on file with authors); Edward J.
McCaffery, “A New Understanding of Tax,” 103 Mich. L. Rev. 807, 920
(2005) (“Taxes on capital are easily avoided and virtually voluntary.”); C.
Eugene Steuerle, “Individuals Pay Very Little Individual Income Tax on
Capital Income,” Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, TaxVox blog, Sept.
6, 2018.
2
3

McCaffery, id.
IRC sections 475, 877A, and 1256.
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law). Here, we evaluate the retroactivity concerns
that the legislation’s opponents have raised.
On its face, the MTM Act is not retroactive. A
retroactive tax can be understood as one that
alters one’s liability for a tax year before
enactment of the tax. For example, most would
agree that if Congress enacted legislation in 2020
requiring taxpayers to recalculate their 2015
income tax liability with new higher rates, that
measure would fit the common-sense definition
of a retroactive tax. By contrast, the MTM Act
would introduce a new method of income tax
accounting for gains and losses for a small subset
of wealthy New York taxpayers. It would apply a
prospective tax at the regular state income tax rate
on resident billionaires’ unrealized capital gains
through a deemed sale mechanism. The act’s
mark-to-market method of accounting is a wellestablished approach in federal and New York
income tax law for some types of taxpayers (for
example, dealers in securities) and some types of
financial instructions (for example, specific
futures contracts). By extending the mark-tomarket accounting method to a new class of
taxpayers, the MTM Act would apply more
broadly than these features of existing law. The
MTM Act would generate an estimated $23.3
billion in additional state revenue in 2020, and
another $1.2 billion in each subsequent year.
Three features of the MTM Act could raise
retroactivity issues. First, there is a question
whether the state can apply a deemed-sale
mechanism going forward given that this
mechanism would affect gains accrued before the
current tax year. Second, the act would apply to all
unrealized capital gains since a billionaire became
a New York resident, so in the first year it could
tax the accumulated gains of many past years.
Third, the MTM Act defines state residency based
on a billionaire being present in the state for 183
days in 2020, and since we are now in February
2021 (as of publication), billionaire taxpayers
would likely have already satisfied the residency
requirement based on their past presence in the
state.

4

For a prior write-up of a portion of our analysis, see Gamage,
Emmanuel Saez, and Darien Shanske, “The NY Billionaire Mark-toMarket Tax Act: Revenue, Economic, and Constitutional Analysis” (Dec.
9, 2020).
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Do these provisions raise a federal or state
constitutional issue? The MTM Act will likely be
challenged in the courts, so it is important to
resolve this question.
I. Analytic Frame
Before applying case law to the MTM Act, it
would be helpful to look at the broader principles
that should — and that actually do — underlie
this area of law. First, when the government
imposes tax or changes a tax, then that law, like all
economic regulations, is subject to rational basis
review.
Second, broad-based changes to tax systems
should almost always be constitutional, at least
regarding possible retroactivity concerns, despite
their inevitable impact on taxpayer expectations.
For instance, suppose the federal government
instituted a value added tax. Such a change would
have a big impact on those who have already
retired on a fixed income and, for this reason,
there should perhaps be transition relief. But if
Congress opted to enact a value added tax
without providing that relief — or not very much
relief — then that would not render the tax reform
unconstitutional because of the retroactive effects.
Similarly, within the income tax, there is no
requirement that the tax system provide for net
operating loss deductions, much less that
Congress cannot change those deductions.
Indeed, the federal government did make NOLs
less generous as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
and California just capped the use of NOLs for
two years in response to the current crisis. Again,
although these sorts of tax law changes can
undeniably have retroactive effects, these types of
retroactive effects simply do not put the
constitutionality of these sorts of tax law changes
into question.
There are many further examples. Consider
reforms that would treat capital gains the same as
ordinary income, eliminate stepped-up basis at
death, or even move toward full expensing for
more business investments while limiting interest
payment deductions (as many in the right-ofcenter tax policy community advocate). All would
retroactively affect many taxpayers. Nevertheless,
assuming the changes satisfy rational basis, they
should be constitutional. As noted, the law
typically follows this principle — so cases
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challenging these broad changes as
unconstitutional are rare. Any rule to the contrary
would make it difficult or impossible for
Congress or state legislatures to reform the tax
law.
Third, though broad changes to tax systems
must be permitted as a general rule, there are
instances of changes that appear more
problematic. These are typically amendments to
specific substantive rules that affect the tax
treatment of completed transactions. These
changes are typically challenged as violating due
process rights as unduly retroactive.
These sorts of changes to substantive rules
that raise more problematic retroactivity concerns
can be distinguished from the broad-based
changes discussed earlier by looking to whether
the amendments in question affect tax returns
5
filed in previous years. If a legal change affects a
prior-year tax return in a manner that would
require taxpayers to revise those returns, then this
raises potentially troubling retroactivity concerns.
By contrast, if a broad-based legal change has
more nebulous retroactive effects that do not
affect any prior-year tax returns and would not
require taxpayers to revise those returns, then
these effects generally do not raise
constitutionality concerns. Again, this is because
almost all major tax reforms create these sorts of
more nebulous retroactive effects by altering the
future consequences of taxpayers’ past actions.
Taxpayers simply do not have general reliance
interests against legislators reforming the tax law.
Fourth, there is no firm rule prohibiting the
narrow class of truly retroactive statutes that do
affect prior-year tax returns. The retroactivity of
these statutes is itself subject to rationality review
and in many cases is upheld. Thus, for example,
when the statute is remedial and applies to
transactions not overly remote in time, the statute
should be — and is — upheld. The less a statute is
remedial, the farther back it goes, and the more it
unsettles reasonable expectations, the more likely
it should be struck down.

II. The Key Case Law Precedents
As explained, we think the case law broadly
follows our analytic structure and will discuss
some key cases.
A. Early Income Tax Cases
The first income tax statute passed after
ratification of the 16th Amendment was
retroactive by 10 months and upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court from a due process challenge in
6
Union Pacific Railroad. Taxpayers challenged the
original income tax for taxing dividends
themselves derived from earnings accumulated
before there was an income tax. This challenge
7
was rejected. Taxpayers challenged the
retroactive application of a new tax on dividends
imposed by Wisconsin in connection with the
Great Depression. This challenge was rejected and
resulted in the rightfully famous dictum from
Justice Harlan F. Stone:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on
the taxpayer nor a liability which he
assumes by contract. It is but a way of
apportioning the cost of government
among those who in some measure are
privileged to enjoy its benefits and must
bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys
immunity from that burden, its retroactive
imposition does not necessarily infringe
due process, and to challenge the present
tax it is not enough to point out that the
taxable event, the receipt of income,
8
antedated the statute.
Thus, from the earlier period of the income
tax, short retroactivity periods at the time of
enactment were permissible. Further, claims that
taxpayers had a vested right to the treatment of
their economic activities accorded by a previous
tax system were rejected.

6
7
5

We thank Susan Morse for this way of explaining the relevant
doctrine.

8

Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1, 10 (1916).
Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918).
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938).
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B. Carlton
The leading modern Supreme Court case on
9
retroactivity is Carlton, decided in 1994. The issue
in Carlton was the constitutionality of an
amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that
Congress approved. As adopted in October 1986,
IRC section 2057 granted an estate tax deduction
for half the proceeds of “any sale of employer
securities by the executor of an estate” to an
employee stock ownership plan.
This provision did not limit the deduction to
securities held by the decedent at the time of
death. In December 1986, Carlton, acting as an
executor, purchased shares in a corporation, sold
them to that company’s ESOP at a loss, and
claimed a large 2057 deduction on the decedent’s
estate tax return. In December 1987, Congress
amended section 2057 to provide that to qualify
for the deduction, the securities sold to an ESOP
must have been “directly owned” by the decedent
“immediately before death.” The amendment
applied retroactively, as if it were incorporated in
the original 1986 provision. Carlton sued for the
estate, arguing that the amendment’s retroactive
application to his transactions violated the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that this retroactive
application was rendered unduly harsh and
oppressive, and therefore unconstitutional, by
Carlton’s lack of notice that section 2057 would be
retroactively amended and by his reasonable
reliance to his detriment on pre-amendment law.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
holding that the 1987 amendment’s retroactive
application to Carlton’s 1986 transactions did not
violate due process. First, the Court explained
that “the ‘harsh and oppressive’ [test for
retroactive taxation, derived from Welch v.
Henry] . . . ‘does not differ from the prohibition
against arbitrary and irrational legislation’ that
applies generally to enactments in the sphere of
10
economic policy.”
The Court then explained that under the
applicable standard, a tax statute’s retroactive
application must only be supported by a
legitimate legislative purpose furthered by
9

rational means. The Court held that Congress’s
purpose in enacting the 1987 amendment was
neither illegitimate nor arbitrary: Section 2057
was originally intended to create an incentive for
stockholders to sell their companies to their
employees, but the absence of a decedent stock
ownership requirement resulted in the
deduction’s broad availability to virtually any
estate at an estimated loss to the government of
up to $7 billion in anticipated revenues. Thus, the
Court explained, Congress undoubtedly intended
the amendment to correct what it reasonably
viewed as a mistake in the original provision.
The Supreme Court stated that there was no
plausible contention that Congress acted with an
improper motive, and that its decision to prevent
the unanticipated revenue loss by denying the
deduction to those who made purely taxmotivated stock transfers was not unreasonable.
Moreover, the Court held, the amendment’s
retroactive application was rationally related to its
legitimate purpose, since Congress acted
promptly in proposing the amendment within a
few months of section 2057’s original enactment
and established a modest retroactivity period that
extended only slightly longer than one year. The
Court held that the circuit court’s exclusive focus
on the taxpayer’s notice and reliance held section
2057 to an unduly strict standard.11
Returning to our analytic frame, the statute in
question did narrowly amend the substantive tax
law as to transactions completed in the past —
unlike the broad changes to tax systems we
canvassed in the earlier cases. Nevertheless,
applying the rationality test to the retroactivity,
and clearly considering the statute’s remedial
nature, the Court found the statute permissible.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a
concurrence for herself alone. She was concerned
that the majority opinion could be read to give the
government too much leeway. Her reasoning is
important because it sets a kind of floor.
O’Connor argued that:
A period of retroactivity longer than the year
preceding the legislative session in which the
law was enacted would raise, in my view,
serious constitutional questions. But in

United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994).

10

Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted).
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11

Id. at 35.
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keeping with Congress’s practice of
limiting the retroactive effect of revenue
measures (a practice that may reflect
Congress’s sensitivity to the due process
problems that would be raised by
overreaching), the December 1987,
amendment to 2057 was made retroactive
only to October 1986. Given our
precedents and the limited period of
retroactivity, I concur in the judgment of
the Court that applying the amended
statute to respondent Carlton did not
12
violate due process.
Since Carlton, the Court has declined to revisit
the retroactivity issue regarding state tax laws,
13
despite repeated attempts to persuade it to do so.
In nontax contexts, the Court approved longer
periods of retroactivity; for example, O’Connor
herself approved a six-year retroactive law in
General Motors in the context of employers’
obligations to pay workers’ compensation
14
benefits.
Other courts have approved much longer
retroactivity periods. For example, in Tesoro
Refining, a Washington appeals court held that an
amendment to tax law with 24 years’ retroactive
effect unconstitutional. The state supreme court
reversed on grounds that the newly enacted law
merely clarified preexisting law and thus was not
15
a retroactive change at all.

12

Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Note, however, that Justice Antonin
Scalia concurred as well and would apparently have approved unlimited
retroactivity: “The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in
this case guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid.
. . . I welcome this recognition that the Due Process Clause does not
prevent retroactive taxes.”
13

See most recently Dot Foods Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 372 P.3d
747 (Wash. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2156 (2017) and six consolidated
cases from Michigan pertaining to the Multistate Tax Compact that were
filed for 22 companies: Sonoco Products Co. v. Michigan Department of
Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
v. Department of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Gillette Commercial
Operations North America v. Department of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017);
International Business Machines Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 137 S. Ct.
2157 (2017); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Department of Treasury, 137 S.
Ct. 2157 (2017); and DIRECTV Group Holdings LLC v. Department of
Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017). The petitions in the consolidated
Michigan cases all derived from the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision
in Gillette Commercial Operations North America v. Department of Treasury,
878 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied, 880 N.W.2d 230 (Mich.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017).
14

General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992) (unanimous
opinion by Justice O’Connor).
15

Tesoro Refining and Marketing Co. v. Department of Revenue, No.
85556-1. (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2012).

C. Subpart F and MTM cases
In response to policy concerns regarding
evasion or more accurate measuring of income,
Congress has added many provisions to the IRC
that tax undistributed profits or economic income.
Not surprisingly, given the earlier precedents
permitting Congress to subject new types of
income to tax, even income not previously taxed,
taxpayer challenges to those provisions have been
unsuccessful. For example, courts have approved
of the foreign personal holding company regime,
enacted in 1937 to tax the undistributed profits of
foreign “incorporated pocketbooks” controlled by
U.S. residents, and the subpart F regime (1962),
which taxes specific undistributed income of
16
controlled foreign corporations. Mark-to-market
regimes in the IRC include sections 475 (MTM for
securities dealers), 1256 (MTM for some
contracts), and 1296 (elective MTM for publicly
traded passive foreign investment companies).
Only section 1256 was challenged on
constitutional grounds, and the Ninth Circuit
held that because the taxpayer could have
realized his gains on any given day, MTM was
17
constitutional.
D. New York Case Law
The New York courts also apply the Carlton
test, though the Court of Appeals has its own test
for constitutionality under the due process clause
18
of the state constitution. As to the New York test,
courts look to three factors: (1) “the taxpayer’s
forewarning of a change in the legislation and the
reasonableness of . . . reliance on the old law,” (2)
“the length of the retroactive period,” and (3) “the
19
public purpose for retroactive application.”
In a recent case applying retroactivity, the
Court of Appeals considered legislation meant to
correct a strained — but not wholly implausible

16

See Eder v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 27 (2nd Cir. 1943) (upholding
foreign personal holding company regime); Garlock Inc. v. Commissioner,
489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding subpart F).
17

Murphy v. United States, 992 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1993).

18

James Square Associates LP v. Mullen, 21 N.Y.3d 233, 247-48 (2013)
(“An aggrieved taxpayer may choose to make a claim that a retroactive
tax violates the Due Process Clause under the standards in United States
v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994) and our
precedent in Replan.”).
19

Id. at 246, citing Matter of Replan Development v. Department of
Housing Preservation and Development, 70 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1987).
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— reading of the New York state personal income
tax that permitted taxpayers to avoid paying the
tax on their sale of an S corporation that made an
20
election under IRC 338(h)(10). The taxpayerfriendly reading had persuaded two tax tribunals,
21
occasioning the need for legislation. Despite the
related lower court victories, the appellate court
found that the taxpayer’s aggressive reading of
the tax law was not reasonable given longstanding understandings of the previous statute.
The court further held that the Legislature’s
curative purpose to be rational and a three-and-ahalf-year retroactivity period reflecting open tax
years was not excessive — thus upholding the
retroactive statute.
On the other side of the ledger, the Court of
Appeals in 2013 found that retroactive changes to a
tax credit program were not permissible. The court
found that there was limited forewarning and too
long a retroactive period even though the
retroactive period was arguably only 16 months,
but it was the third factor that was “dispositive”
because “the legislature did not have an important
public purpose to make the law retroactive. It was
not attempting to correct an error in the tax code as
in Carlton, or to prevent ‘the loss of [single-roomoccupancy] housing and to discourage the
precipitous eviction of tenants’ as in Replan [a
retroactivity case the state won]. . . . Retroactively
denying tax credits to plaintiffs did nothing to spur
investment, to create jobs, or to prevent prior abuse
of the credit. The retroactive application of the 2009
Amendments simply punished the Program
participants more harshly for behavior that already
occurred and that they could not alter.”22
New York constitutional common law
therefore reflects the principle that retroactive
revocation of specific benefits can be found
unconstitutional, but there is more leeway when
taxpayers do not have reasonable reliance or
when the statute is curative.

20

Note that the prospective application of the income tax to deemed
assets sales under IRC section 338(h)(10) was challenged as, in effect,
subjecting intangible property to an ad valorem property tax in violation
of Article XVI, section 3 of the New York Constitution. That claim was
rejected in Burton v. Department of Taxation and Finance, 25 N.Y.3d 732; 16
N.Y.S.3d 215; 37 N.E.3d 718 (2015).

E. Moore and the Transition Tax
Another recent example at the federal level
was the transition tax imposed in 2017 on the
accumulated offshore earnings of U.S.-based
multinationals. The TCJA imposed a one-time tax
at 8 percent on illiquid assets and 15.5 percent on
liquid assets accumulated by the CFCs of U.S.
multinational enterprises. This tax applied to
earnings accumulated offshore between 1986 and
2017, which amounted to over $3 trillion.
A district court recently rejected a
constitutional challenge to the transition tax based
on retroactivity.23 The government argued that the
transition tax should not really be analyzed as
retroactive at all so much as a change to a new tax
system. The district court rejected this argument,
but nonetheless upheld the tax under Carlton.
First, the court reasoned that it was rational for
Congress to transition to a territorial system and,
as part of that transition, subject earnings to tax
that were subject to tax under the previous system
if distributed, but would otherwise never be taxed
under the old system. The old system created an
incentive for these earnings to accumulate abroad,
which made the statute in part remedial. Given
these reasonable purposes, choosing a retroactive
period back to the last major tax overhaul (1986)
was reasonable.
F. Assessment of the Cases
Generally, this survey of the case precedents
— including New York case precedents —
indicates that the current law governing
retroactivity is broadly consistent with our
normative prescription: There is no vested right in
the tax system as such, including as to the
realization requirement. Thus, the retroactive
effects of broad-based tax law changes generally
do not raise significant constitutional concerns,
especially when no prior-year tax returns are
affected. As to narrow tax law changes upon
which there could have been specific reliance,
short periods of retroactivity imposed within a
year of the enactment of tax legislation are still
generally permitted. By contrast, the retroactive
revocation of specific tax benefits on which

21

Caprio v. Department of Taxation and Finance, 25 N.Y.3d 744, 749; 37
N.E.3d 707, 711 (2015).
22

James Square Associates, 21 N.Y.3d at 249-50; 993 N.E.2d 374, 383
(2013).
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23

See, e.g., Moore v. United States, Case No. C19-1539-JCC (W.D. Wash.
2020).
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taxpayers reasonably relied and that require
taxpayers to revise prior-year tax returns is
generally disfavored, but may still be permitted
— especially with a remedial purpose.
G. Application to the MTM Act
Where does the MTM Act stand in regard to
retroactivity?
First, its residency provision falls squarely
within even O’Connor’s criteria for permitted
retroactivity, since the MTM Act applies only to
2020 New York residents.
Second, as to the prospective shift to an MTM
system, this is permissible because taxpayers have
no vested rights in the prior tax system and this
shift does not affect any prior-year tax returns.
Third, the taxation of previously accumulated
gains in the first year should be permissible for the
same reasons: This is just a deemed-sale
mechanism that does not affect any prior-year tax
returns, but only changes the rules for tax returns
that will be filed for the 2020 tax year; those tax
returns cannot be filed until 2021. (Some
taxpayers may have already filed tax returns for
2020 before its enactment, but assuming that the
MTM Act is enacted before the end of 2021, this
would just be a reasonable retroactive period of
one year or less for 2020 tax returns.)
Alternatively, the constitutionality of the first
year of the MTM Act tax can be analyzed by
analogy with the transition tax. It is true that
going forward, the New York measure would tax
gain that occurred in that tax year, while the firstyear tax would tax gain that has occurred over
many years. Yet, like the worldwide earnings that
could have been taxed in Moore, the unrealized
gains at issue here represent income that could
24
have been taxed when it was earned. Further,
also like the transition tax, New York can (and
should) reasonably shift to MTM because, as with
the old worldwide system, it incentivized
deferral. The shift to MTM is thus remedial too.
Further, and even better for the MTM transition,
New York is transitioning toward taxing
unrealized gains, hence not taxing these gains
would result in an inequitable windfall that it can

ill afford at the moment. Reducing increasing
levels of inequality, equalizing treatment among
the wealthy, and ending deferral to cope with an
unprecedented emergency would all seem to
count as important and rational purposes.
Given that the New York test follows that of
the federal common law, New York courts might
also just analyze the tax law under rational basis
review as a general change to the tax system.
Nevertheless, applying New York’s three-part
test, we arrive at a similar result. First, in contrast
to James Square Associates, in which after the
taxpayer changed its behavior to obtain tax
credits and the court held that the Legislature
could not retroactively take them away, here there
has been no such reliance on a realization rule:
Taxpayers have already received the benefit of
deferral and the Legislature would only be ending
that going forward. Therefore, there is no reliance
except on a static tax system, which is not
reasonable.
Second, including all accumulated gains is
necessary to achieve many of the statute’s
important goals. Further, the 10-year deferral
option at a reasonable rate of interest essentially
means that the deferral is being included ratably.
It is hard to characterize such a regime as “harsh
and oppressive” for a billionaire, who is likely to
still make money during the deferral. Third, as
noted, the Legislature had important purposes in
ending the deferral regime — one of which is
remedial.
Tension between the first and third prongs
also weighs in favor of constitutionality. Suppose
the taxpayers strongly insist that they never
expected to pay anything on their accumulated
gains ever, and therefore that they had inadequate
warning. That may be true, but there was no
specific reliance — no change in behavior
analogous to making investments to get a tax
credit. Thus, we think this argument should be
rejected as legally irrelevant but note that, to the
extent it is true (that is, vast amounts of income
were not going to be taxed under the old system),
then that only strengthens the remedial purpose
of the law.
III. Conclusion

24

This is why objections to the MTM Act based on New York
constitutional prohibitions on wealth taxation are frivolous, because
unrealized gains are income, not wealth.

If the New York MTM Act is enacted, some
billionaires are likely to challenge it in court, but it
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would almost certainly be upheld against any
constitutional challenge based on retroactivity. In
that case, it could be a model for other states and
for the federal government if it seeks to move
away from the outdated realization requirement,
as U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., has proposed to
25
do. 


25

See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, “Wyden Unveils Proposal to
Fix Broken Tax Code, Equalize Treatment of Wages and Wealth, Protect
Social Security,” Sept. 12, 2019.
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